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ABSTRACT
The author investigates the role of constitutive rules in the construction of 
social reality. He denies that constitutive rules are a suffi cient condition 
of a practice such as a chess game. To create a new practice with rules, it 
is necessary that there already be the grammar of this practice, that is, the 
sense of this practice (for example, the sense of game). It is the grammar 
of a practice and not its constitutive rules that determines the nature of a 
practice. The sense of a practice cannot be created by constitutive rules.
Key words: constitutive rules, practice, 
social ontology, institutional fact.
RESUMEN
El autor investiga el papel desarrollado por las reglas constitutivas en la 
construcción de la realidad social. En particular, niega que, por jemplo, 
las reglas constitutivas del ajedrez sean condición sufi ciente de la práctica 
llamada juego del ajedrez. Para crear una nueva práctica, se necesita también 
la existencia de la gramática de esa práctica, o sea el sentido mismo de la 
práctica (por ejemplo: el sentido de juego). Es la gramática de una práctica 
(y no las reglas constitutivas) la que determina la naturaleza de la práctica 
misma. El sentido de una práctica no puede ser creado por las reglas 
constitutivas.
Palabras clave: reglas constitutivas, práctica, 
ontología social, hecho institucional.
Constitutive Rules and Sense of Game
This essay concerns social ontology. In social ontology, a fundamental 
distinction is that (proposed by the American philosopher John R. Searle) 
between brute facts and institutional facts.
For Searle (1969, 51), institutional facts are facts which, unlike brute 
facts, presuppose the existence of certain human “institutions”. The adjective 
‘institutional’ that Searle uses to qualify kind of fact derives from this 
defi nition of institutional facts.
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If one ignores this distinction one may commit the error of confusing 
institutional status (like being a Lord-Mayor, Judge and Bishop) and objects 
that are only indicators of status. Jonathan Swift (1960, 283) describes this 
confusion genially in the following way: “These animals, which are vulgarly 
called suits of clothes, or dressed, do according to certain compositions 
receive different appellations. If one of them be trimmed up with a gold 
chain, and a red gown, and a white rod, and a great horse, it is called a 
Lord-Mayor; if certain ermines and furs be placed in a certain position, we 
style them a Judge, and so an apt conjunction of lawn and black satin we 
entitled a Bishop”.
In order to characterize the concept of institutional fact and to distinguish 
institutional facts from brute facts, Searle uses the concept of a “constitutive 
rule”. In fact, for Searle (1969, 51), “institutions” are systems of constitutive 
rules.
Searle distinguishes two different sorts of rules: regulative rules and 
constitutive rules. For Searle (1969, 34), “regulative rules regulate a pre-
existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the 
rules”, whereas “constitutive rules constitute [...] an activity the existence 
of which is logically dependent on the rules”. For example, “the rules of 
football or chess [...] do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but 
as it were they create the very possibility of playing such games”.
My point of departure is the thesis that constitutive rules create the 
possibility of new forms of behavior. The question that I ask in the present 
essay is: It is really true that a new (type of) institutional activity can be 
created only by constitutive rules? This essay investigates the way in which an 
institutional activity is created by means of constitutive rules, but also the limits 
and the conditions of the creation of institutional activities by constitutive 
rules. In other words, the question is, Are the constitutive rules of a practice 
a necessary and suffi cient condition of the type of practice that is its object?1 
My answer is this: constitutive rules can create the possibility of 
new forms of behavior (a new rule-constituted activity), but they can not 
themselves create a new practice. They can not be a necessary and suffi cient 
condition of a practice.
In order to explain and demonstrate this thesis, I begin by looking at 
the thesis argued for Searle (1969, 33-34):
The activity of playing chess is constituted by acting in accordance 
with the appropriate rules.
1 The idea that they are rules which create new possibilities of action can already be found 
in the work of the Polish legal philosopher Czeslaw Znamierowski (1924). (Cf. Giuseppe 
Lorini 2000, 69-81). 
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Is it true, however, that the activity of playing chess consists in acting 
in accordance with the constitutive rules of chess? In other words, does the 
activity of playing chess consist in acting in accordance with the constitutive 
rules that constitute the possible moves and the values of the chess pieces?
 (‘Constitutive rules of chess’ I understand to be those rules that are 
specifi c to the game of chess; in other terms, all the rules that defi ne the 
possible moves in the game and the value of chess pieces.2 It is those rules 
that distinguish the game of chess from soccer or checkers.)
Another philosopher, Hubert Schwyzer has criticized the Searle’s thesis. 
Schwyzer doesn’t deny that chess is a game played by acting in conformity 
to the rules of the game. In other words, Schwyzer doesn’t deny that the 
game of chess is a rule-governed activity. What he denies is:
fi rst, that the sense of game characterising the activity of playing chess 
derives from acting in conformity to the rules of the game;
second, that the sense of game characterising the institution called 
‘chess’ is constituted by the rules of chess.
(i) First, Schwyzer denies that the sense of game characterising the 
activity of playing chess consists in acting in conformity to the rules of chess:
There is all the difference in the world between saying that the game of 
chess is defi ned by its rules, or that chess is a game played in accordance 
with these rules, and saying that the activity of playing chess is constituted 
by action in accordance with these rules, or that the rules defi ne that activity. 
The former is unexceptionable, the latter false (SCHWYZER 1969, 454).
For Schwyzer (1969, 464), “playing chess does not consist in acting in 
accordance with the rules. The rules do not explicate the concept of playing 
chess; they do not establish what it is to play chess.” Acting in accordance with 
these rules isn’t a suffi cient condition for the fact that you are playing chess.
An similar observation occurs in Josef Schächter (1935). Schächter 
argues that it is not suffi cient to act according to the rules of chess to play 
chess. In the case of a person who practices the rules of chess with his 
instructor, these two people are not playing chess. In Schächter’s terminology, 
they are not “using” the rules, but only demonstrating them. Schächter writes:
2 For this kind of rule, Amedeo G. Conte proposed the name ‘eidetic-costitutive rule’. 
Conte (1988, 252) writes: “The eidetic-constitutive rules are those that determine the 
connotation of those terms that (in the formulation of the rules) designate the praxemes 
(the units of praxis) which are governed by the rules. For example the rules of chess are 
eidetic-constitutive because (and in the sense that) they determine the connotation of terms 
(‘bishop’, ‘castling’, ‘check’, ...) which designate the praxemes (pieces, pragmemes, game 
situations) of the game”. 
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In teaching chess, an instructor can proceed by practising with his pupil the 
rules of the game, in such a way that in the usual sequence (move – counter 
move) the pupil moves his pieces according to the prescribed rules. One may 
ask: are these two playing chess or not? [...] We must say that they are, for 
all the rules are being obeyed. But in another sense we might say that they 
are not, for they are playing merely to demonstrate the rules of the game, 
they are doing its grammar. So long as it is viewed merely as demonstrating 
rules, it does not yet belong to the game; but as soon as we abandon the way 
of demonstration, we are playing chess. (To decide whether it is a case of 
demonstrating or actually using the rules, one can do no more than ask the 
players or infer their intentions from their behaviour.)
 (ii) Second, Schwyzer denies, also, that the sense of game characterising 
the game of chess is constituted by the rules of chess. As Schwyzer writes:
That chess is a game is in no way a rule of the game (SCHWYZER 1969, 463).
The problem here is: in what does the sense of game of an activity like 
playing chess consist?
Chess-like Game vs. Chess-like Rite
Schwyzer explains and proves the apparently counterintuitive thesis that 
the sense of game isn’t intrinsic to the activity constituted by the constitutive 
rules of chess, proposing a mental experiment:
Imagine the following. I have now been in Ruritania some time, and can speak 
the language tolerably well. One day I accompany my host with his family 
to a certain building, where a large number of people are sitting in a circle 
on the fl oor, murmuring among themselves agitatedly. In the center of the 
circle is a small table with two chairs, and on the table is a chessboard with 
chessmen arranged as for the beginning of a game. After a while, two men 
in elaborate clothes enter the room and seat themselves at opposite sides of 
the table; whereupon those sitting on the fl oor fall silent and watch intently. 
The men at the table then proceed, with what appears to be an air of great 
concentration, to move the chess pieces around on the board according to the 
rules of chess. It strikes me, however, that they play a rather wild game, and 
I can see no consistent strategy in the moves of either player. The excitement 
mounts until, after an hour or so, white mates black. Then everyone present, 
including both men at the table, shows signs of extreme relief; they mop 
their brows, smile and congratulate one another (SCHWYZER 1969, 456).
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Continuing with his mental experiment, Schwyzer imagines that, on 
returning to home, he shows his own chess set to his host and he asks him 
to play chess. But here is the surprising reaction of his host to this request:
He turns pale, is horrifi ed and appalled, and insists that I put it away 
immediately. “Blasphemer!” he exclaims. “Did you want to play at chess 
with me?” And did you forge that chess set?” (SCHWYZER 1969, 456).
Why did Schwyzer’s host react in this way to the simple request to play 
chess? Schwyzer understands the reason of this excessive reaction when 
his host explains to him what the practice of chess consists of in Ruritania:
There is, he says, only one chess set for each community. Chess is enacted 
once every year by the priest of the community, for purposes of determining 
the will of the gods. If white mates black, the community and the crops will 
fl ourish; if black mates white, there will be trouble (SCHWYZER 1969, 457).
Then, to the Schwyzer’s question whether the white should always win, 
the host, once more shocked, answers in this way:
Chess is not a duel or a battle. It is a sacred rite. There is no winning or 
losing at all (SCHWYZER 1969, 457).3 
Here the misunderstanding is revealed: in Ruritania, chess is not a 
game, but a religious rite that is enacted only once a year by the priest of 
3 Victory in a game is a very interesting phenomenon for the investigation of institutional 
reality. Victory in a game like chess presupposes the existence of the institution of chess. 
You can not win a chess match, if there isn’t the institution of the chess game. But the 
meaning of ‘victory’ and the meaning of ‘defeat’ in the sphere of an institution seem go 
beyond the boundaries of the single institution. The institutions determine the conditions of 
victory and defeat, and then the extension of the words ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ in the sphere 
of an institution like chess or soccer. But the intension of the two words is not determined 
by the institutions that determine the conditions of victory and defeat. Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1969) asks: “What do winning and loosing in a game consist in?” And he answers: “Of 
course not in the game’s situation that produces the victory”. The meaning of ‘victory’ and 
the meaning of ‘defeat’ seem to go beyond the boundaries of a single institution. Victory 
and defeat seem not to be institutional concepts, but rather meta-institutional concepts (I 
owe the phrase ‘institutional concept’ to Dolores Miller (1981, 191)): they do not have in the 
institutions their own conditions of possibility, but on the contrary it is they that constitute 
the conditions of possibility of certain institutions like competitive games. Besides, a sign of 
the their meta-institutionality is constituted by their trans-institutionality. In fact, whereas the 
conditions of victory and defeat change as we shift from one game to another, the meaning 
of ‘victory’ and the meaning of ‘defeat’ remain unchanged. 
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the community.4 The rite of chess is not a form of competition: in the rite 
of chess, you can’t win or loose, because victory and defeat don’t compose 
the grammar of the rite.
Consequently, for the grammar of rite, in Ruritania’s chess it doesn’t 
make sense to talk of strategy.
In this mental experiment, Schwyzer focuses on the fact that the 
differences between the game of chess and the rite of chess are not 
determined by the constitutive rules of chess. Indeed, the activity of the two 
practices (rite of chess and game of chess) is governed by the same rules: 
the constitutive rules of chess.
But where then lies the difference between the two practices?
 (i) The difference between the two practices doesn’t appear on the brute 
level of description of the action. It is not perceivable in the observation of 
mere physical activities that compose the two practices.
Additionally, the difference between the two practices doesn’t consist 
even in mental events in the minds of the players. Schwyzer writes:
The difference between the rite of chess and the game of chess lies not at 
all in what goes on at the board, nor in anything in the minds of those who 
make the moves (SCHWYZER 1969, 464).
(ii) The difference between the two practices doesn’t appear even to 
the institutional level of description of the action. Indeed, the two practices, 
sharing the same system of rules, necessarily also share the same institutional 
support consisting in an activity according the constitutive rules of chess.
(iii) Instead, the difference between the two practices consists in the 
different role, in the different value, that the activity has in the everyday 
life of those who practice it:
The difference lies away from the board altogether, in what Wittgenstein 
calls the “role” of the activity in the lives of those for whom it is a practice 
(SCHWYZER 1969, 464).
For Schwyzer, it is the different grammar of the two activities that 
distinguishes the game of chess from the rite of chess. It is the grammar 
of a practice and not its constitutive rules that determines its nature, and 
consequently its sense of rite or its sense of game:
4 A similar case is described by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1983, p. 46). Lévi-Strauss describes 
the case of Gahuku-Gama people from New Guinea “qui ont appris le football, mais qui 
jouent, plusieurs jours de suite, autant de parties qu’il est nécessaire pour que s’équilibrent 
exactement celles perdues et celles gagnées par chaque camp”. They consider “un jeu comme 
un rite”. 
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The nature of a given practice is defi ned not by its rules, but by its “grammar” 
(SCHWYZER 1969, 463).
Schwyzer (1969, 463) believes that the fact “that chess is a game is in 
no way a rule of the game”. It is a grammatical proposition.5  In this regard, 
he writes:
What makes chess-playing the kind of thing it is is a matter of what sorts 
of things it makes sense to say with respect to chess, of what sorts of things 
are, in a logical sense, relevant or appropriate to say with regard to chess 
(SCHWYZER 1969, 454).6 
Schwyzer further argues:
It belongs to the grammar of “chess” that we can say such things as “Let’s 
play chess”, “That was a wise (a silly) move”, we can ask who won or is 
winning, say “Bad luck” to the one and “Well played” to the other after the 
game is over; these ways of speaking are intrinsically relevant in the context 
of chess, not in the context of, say, Mass (SCHWYZER 1969, 455).
In the same way, the fact that chess presuppose skill belongs to the 
grammar of chess.
Similarly, it is because of its grammar that the rite of chess is different 
from the game of chess. The rite of chess, indeed, unlike the game of chess, 
is not a form of competition and, so, it doesn’t make sense to talk in the rite 
of chess about victory and defeat, or even strategy.
For Schwyzer, the word ‘grammar’ in the phrase ‘grammar of chess’ 
has a very similar meaning to the term ‘grammar’ used in the ordinary 
schoolbook grammar. Similarly the grammar as a theory of syntax means 
that ‘children’ is a noun and ‘play’ is a verb and that it is meaningful to write 
‘The children play’, but not ‘The play children’; the grammar of a practice 
means that chess is a competition, and it means that it makes sense to say 
certain things with regard to chess, but not with regard to other practices.
Schwyzer’s observation suggests that there is a level of institutional 
action (the level of the activity that has a sense of a practice, like a sense of 
game or a sense of rite), where the constitutive rules don’t work.
5 Here are four examples of grammatical propositions in the essay of Schwyzer: (i) 
Promises ought to be kept, (ii) Chess is a competitive game, (iii) Sensations are private, (iv) 
Expectation is a state. 
6 Schwyzer borrows the term ‘grammar’ from Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), who writes 
in §§ 371 e 373: “Essence is expressed by grammar. [...] Grammar tells what kind of object 
anything is”. 
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With regard to the distinction between the concept of activity constituted 
by rules and the concept of practice, it is clear that acting in accordance 
with the rules of chess isn’t suffi cient, in order to play chess, in the same 
way that acting in accordance with the rules of soccer isn’t suffi cient in 
order to play soccer.
Rule-Constituted Activity vs. Practice
In order to prove that institutional activities and institutions are not mere 
rule-constituted activities, Schwyzer invents a new rule-governed activity 
that isn’t a practice: X-ing. Schwyzer writes:
Suppose I tell you I have created a new form of behaviour, invented a 
new practice, and these are the rules. No, it is not a game or competition 
of any kind, nor a rite or ceremony, nor is it in any sense a “way of doing 
something”, as making a will is a way of providing for one’s property after 
death, has that purpose built into it. It is a new practice altogether, called 
“X-ing”; it requires two participants, the “initiator” and the “respondent”, 
and the procedure is as follows. First, the initiator signs his name on this 
special piece of paper called “the pad”; his signing his name there is called 
“launching”. The respondent then has a choice: either he “submits”, which 
is to do this, or he ... and so forth. The whole business is terminated when 
the respondent “declares” - that is, signs his name on the other side of the 
pad (SCHWYZER 1969, 464).
X-ing is a rule-governed activity, i.e. an activity whose nature consists 
in acting in conformity to its constitutive rules. Asks Schwyzer:
What is X-ing? An activity according to these rules (SCHWYZER 1969, 464).
But this activity has no other senses than this. It isn’t a game or a rite. 
It isn’t a way of doing something like a will is a “way of” distributing one’s 
property after one’s death. For Schwyzer, X-ing is a mere rule-governed 
activity that isn’t a practice.
For Schwyzer, X-ing is not a practice for three different reasons.
(i) First, “X-ing hasn’t a grammar” (Schwyzer 1969, 465). There aren’t 
grammatical propositions on the nature of X-ing. Recovering the philosophy 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Schwyzer (1969, 454) defi nes the grammar of an 
activity as that “which makes it an activity of that kind”. The grammar is the 
place of sense (for instance, sense of rite or sense of game) that conditions 
the possibility of being of a practice.
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(ii) Second, there isn’t any situation that counts as an appropriate 
situation to engage in X-ing (Schwyzer 1969, 465).
(iii) Third, X-ing hasn’t any other sense than the sense of acting in 
accordance with its rules:
To act in accordance with those rules is not to do or to be engaged in anything 
other than just that, action in accordance with those rules (SCHWYZER 
1969, 466).
Unlike X-ing, chess is, instead, an example of a rule-governed activity 
that is also a practice. Chess is an example of an activity that can be performed 
only by acting in accordance with constitutive rules, but whose sense doesn’t 
exhaust itself in a simple behaviour that conforms to constitutive rules. Chess 
is a game, but that it is a game is not abducible by the constitutive rules of 
the game. The rules of chess don’t permit the understanding of the sense of 
this activity. The sense of this activity transcends those rules that constitute 
the possibility of the game.
I now return to the initial question posed in this essay: Does the activity 
of playing chess consist in acting in accordance with the constitutive rules 
of chess?
My answer is negative. I believe playing chess doesn’t consist only in 
acting in conformity to the rules of chess. It’s obvious that chess is a game 
played by acting in conformity to its rules. It’s impossible to play chess 
without the rules of chess. But it’s no less true that to move in accordance 
to the rules of chess is not necessarily to play chess. A person who moves 
mechanically chess pieces without a strategy or without the goal of checkmate, 
isn’t playing chess. It’s even possible, following the rules of chess, to perform 
an activity totally different from and also grammatically incompatible with 
the game of chess, such as the rite of chess described by Schwyzer.
Averroës’ Impossible Research
An epistemical thesis corresponds to my ontological thesis about the 
nature of institutional activity: if you don’t know the grammar of a practice, 
you can’t understand what that practice is, even if you know very well the 
constitutive rules of that practice.
For instance, if you don’t understand what a game is, if you don’t know 
the grammar of “game”, you can’t understand what a game of chess is, even 
if you know very well the rules of chess.
Curiously, a similar kind of impossibility is described in a short story 
by Jorge Luis Borges: La busca de Averroes. In this short story, Borges 
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tells us of an impossible research, the research of Averroës. Averroës tried 
to translate the Poetics of Aristotle, but being closed within the limits of 
Islam culture, and not knowing theatre, he couldn’t understand the meaning 
of the two terms ‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’.
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